Iran Update

Alexandra Braverman, Johanna Moore, Siddhant Kishore,

Ben Rezaei, Christina Harward, and Brian Carter


Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

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Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is consolidating political and security power under HTS in a post-Assad Syrian government. HTS-led forces assumed control of Daraa City and the Nassib border crossing from the Southern Operations Room on December 14. Jolani and Southern Operations Room leaders met on December 11 to discuss coordination in military and civil affairs. It is notable that these Syrian groups have agreed to cooperate with HTS despite historical animosity with HTS’s predecessor and al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra in the mid-2010s.


Jolani has continued to integrate HTS allies into the interim Syrian Salvation Government, securing control over key civil and security services. Jolani met with Nour al Dink al Zink commander Ahmed Rizk on December 14 to discuss the role of “revolutionary cadres” in the future Syrian government and the restructuring of the Syrian Defense Ministry. Rizk and his group have long fought alongside HTS in northwestern Syria. Syrian media reported on December 10 that the HTS-controlled interim government also plans to reorganize the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). Reorganization within the Syrian army and Syrian Defense Ministry supports reconciliation with former regime elements but also creates opportunities to appoint HTS loyalists and gain control over the government bureaucracy.


Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander General Mazloum Abdi is attempting to preserve and unify the SDF’s Kurdish base as the group faces two existential threats in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime. Abdi argued that Kurdish unity was critical to address threats currently facing their community. Arab communities in Deir ez Zor and Raqqa have begun defecting from the SDF and calling for an end to SDF rule in Arab areas. The combination of these events threaten to unravel the fragile Kurdish-Arab coalition that the United States helped establish. Turkey is simultaneously threatening to destroy the SDF. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan threatened on December 13 to “eliminate” the SDF, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and People’s Defense Units (YPG). Abdi added that unity and dialogue among the Kurds is critical for participating in the development of the new Syrian government. CTP-ISW assessed that Abdi intends to negotiate its role in a future Syrian government, likely to prevent further unrest within Arab populations and militias under the SDF.


HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani stated on December 14 that Israel used Iran as a “pretext” to enter Syria but he added that HTS has “no intention of entering into conflict with Israel.” IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi reiterated on December 14 that the IDF has no intention of interfering in Syrian domestic affairs or ”ruling” Syria. Halevi added that the IDF is only operating in Syria to ensure the safety of Israel. An IDF company commander in the 603rd Combat Engineering Battalion (7th Armored Brigade) stated that the IDF advanced 10 kilometers into Syria.


The prospects for Russia's continued military presence in Syria remain unclear as reports that Russia is evacuating its military assets from Syria continue. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 14 that "hundreds" of Russian soldiers cannot reach Hmeimim Air Base from Homs Governorate out of fear that Russian forces will come under fire from unspecified actors. The GUR stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) Africa Corps arrived in Syria to protect Russian forces moving towards Russia's bases on the western coast and that Russian Colonel Dmitry Motrenko is negotiating with military contingents in Syria from other unspecified states in order to secure guarantees of "immunity" for Russian soldiers waiting at the Tiyas Air Base west of Palmyra. The GUR also stated that roughly 1,000 Russian personnel left Damascus on December 13 in a column heading towards the Port of Tartus and Hmeimim Air Base, and ISW observed footage on December 13 of Russian military convoys moving from Damascus and other areas in southern Syria, likely towards the two main Russian bases. Reuters reported on December 14 that a "Syrian security official" stationed near Hmeimim Air Base stated that at least one cargo plane flew out of the base on December 14 bound for Libya. Syrian military and security sources reportedly stated that Russia is withdrawing some heavy equipment and senior officers from the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) to Moscow but is currently not planning to permanently pull out of the Port of Tartus or Hmeimim Air Base. A Russian milblogger posted photos and footage on December 14 purportedly showing Russian military assets still operating at the Russian helicopter base at Qamishli in northeastern Syria, and a Russian source claimed on December 14 that Russian forces have withdrawn from their base in Kobani in northern Syria.


The complex nature of the interim Syrian government is likely resulting in conflicting reports about whether Russia is engaged in talks with Syrian opposition groups. Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) controls the Syrian interim government, but HTS and the interim government do not yet have complete control over the disparate groups that helped overthrow the Assad regime. Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated on December 12 that Russia has established contacts with HTS. Reuters reported on December 14 that a Russian source stated that discussions between Russia and the interim Syrian government are ongoing. A "senior rebel official close to the new interim administration" told Reuters, however, that the issue of Russia's military presence in Syria and Russia's previous agreements with the Assad regime are "not under discussion" and that talks at an unspecified time in the future will address this matter. The official reportedly stated that the "Syrian people will have the final say." Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 13 that Mohammed Sabra, a Syrian politician who represented the Syrian opposition's High Negotiations Committee at the 2016 Geneva peace talks on the Syrian Civil War, similarly stated that there should be a referendum in the future to allow the Syrian people to approve any foreign military presence in Syria. It is unclear if Reuter's "senior rebel official close to the new interim administration" who denied talks between Russia and the interim government is a member of HTS or another Syrian opposition group. It remains unclear if Russia is in contact with all the Syrian opposition groups necessary to guarantee the short- and long-term safety of its military bases and select opposition groups may be unaware that Russia is in discussion with other groups. Russian state media has notably not differentiated between different opposition groups when reporting on the situation in Syria, possibly as part of efforts to present the interim government as more united so as to increase the legitimacy of any agreements Russia reaches with one or some of the groups.


Key Takeaways:


  • HTS Consolidates Power in Syria: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani is consolidating political and security power under HTS in a post-Assad Syrian government. Jolani has continued to integrate HTS allies into the interim Syrian Salvation Government, securing control over key civil and security services. The HTS-led interim government also appears to be pursuing legal recourse against former regime officials outside of a constitutionally-bound justice system.


  • Syrian Democratic Forces: Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commander General Mazloum Abdi is attempting to preserve and unify the SDF’s Kurdish base as the group faces two existential threats in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime.


  • Religious and Sectarian Tension in Syria: Some elements in Iran are either alarmed or trying to generate alarm over the status of the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Syria. This alarm is not being reflected in the Syrian information space at this time. The Iranian regime does not appear to have assumed a clear strategy for how to approach the HTS-led interim government in Syria, as exemplified by the contradicting reports regarding the safety of Shia holy sites following the fall of the Assad regime.


  • Israel in Syria: An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on December 14 that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck at least 20 former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) targets across Syria. HTS leader Abu Mohammed al Jolani stated on December 14 that Israel used Iran as a “pretext” to enter Syria but he added that HTS has “no intention of entering into conflict with Israel.”


  • Russia in Syria: The prospects for Russia's continued military presence in Syria remain unclear as reports that Russia is evacuating its military assets from Syria continue. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on December 14 that "hundreds" of Russian soldiers cannot reach Hmeimim Air Base from Homs Governorate out of fear that Russian forces will come under fire from unspecified actors.


  • Hezbollah in Syria: Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem is seeking to develop a working relationship with the HTS-led interim government in Damascus in order to restore Hezbollah’s weapons supply route in Syria.

Click Here to Read the Full Report

ISW–CTP has launched an interactive control of terrain map of Syria in response to the Syrian opposition offensive in northwestern Syria that began on November 27. It represents our medium-confidence assessment. We will continue to refine this control of terrain (CoT) assessment over the coming days, weeks, and months to increase our confidence levels.

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