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The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) launched a coordinated effort in August 2024 to create a centralized separate branch for unmanned systems, likely to reorganize informal specialized drone detachments and centralize procurement of unmanned systems.
The Russian MoD is mainly trying to centralize the state’s control over Russian drone operators and developers, some of whom had enjoyed relative semi-independence from the Russian military bureaucracy. The Russian MoD is also likely trying to free up more manpower by disbanding informal drone detachments to generate assault troops in order to maintain the offensive tempo in Ukraine. Decentralization and greater degrees of independence have given drone operators on both sides of this war advantages in the extremely rapid evolution of combat techniques and in the offense-defense race between drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Russian MoD’s centralization and restructuring efforts may degrade the effectiveness of Russian drone operations and slow the Russian unmanned systems innovation cycle.
The Russian MoD’s initiative to establish the unmanned systems separate branch, reorganize its informal drone forces, and centralize procurement efforts should not be dismissed, as Russia may resolve many of the problems forecasted in this publication in the long-term. Russia’s manpower constraints, manufacturing limitations, and the Russian command’s prioritization of maintaining the battlefield initiative are complicating these efforts, however. Empowering Ukrainian forces to contest the initiative and impose dilemmas on Russia will continue to protract, slow down, and complicate Russian efforts at force restructuring and formal adaptation of unmanned systems into the Russian Armed Forces. ISW will continue to closely track the Russian MoD’s force centralization and force restructuring efforts to establish both the unmanned systems separate branch and the “Rubikon” Center.
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